2007. An Institutional Theory Of Sanctions Onse... May 2026

The full study is available via SAGE Journals or ResearchGate . Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University

: Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions against states where they believe the political institutions will make the sanctions effective.

The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...

: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power.

Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success The full study is available via SAGE Journals

Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure.

Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place: Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" : For sanctions

: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success